Como área interdisciplinar, as Ciências Cognitivas começam a se desenvolver em meados da década de 1950 a partir de uma concepção compartilhada sobre a mente, hoje chamada de cognitivista. Esses pesquisadores concebiam a mente com uma natureza representacional que opera por meio de computações simbólicas. Atualmente, há uma multiplicidade de abordagens e teorias sobre a mente. Nesse espectro de posições, há desde abordagens tradicionais, que concebem a mente como representacional, até abordagens bastante radicais, que negam qualquer natureza representacional para a (...) mente. Após introduzir este tema, apresentamos as críticas de William Ramsey à representação enquanto definidora das Ciências Cognitivas ou, em outros termos, à representação enquanto critério de demarcação do cognitivo. Desenvolveremos uma hipótese interpretativa para a crítica de Ramsey mobilizando o conceito de estratégia de pesquisa, de Hugh Lacey. Apresentaremos a distinção de Lacey entre adoção de uma estratégia e aceitação de uma teoria, discutindo a suposta independência avaliativa entre estratégia e teoria. Finalizaremos com a defesa de um pluralismo de estratégias nas Ciências Cognitivas. Diferente de concepções que buscam reduzir prematuramente as Ciências Cognitivas a uma única estratégia, o pluralismo que defendemos equilibra a eficiência na resolução de problemas com outros valores considerados importantes, como a abrangência empírica e a neutralidade no sentido de inclusividade e equitatividade de valores. No atual momento das ciências cognitivas, o pluralismo de estratégias constitui o caminho mais promissor. (shrink)

We argue that work on norms provides a way to move beyond debates between proponents of individualist and structuralist approaches to bias, oppression, and injustice. We briefly map out the geography of that debate before presenting Charlotte Witt’s view, showing how her position, and the normative ascriptivism at its heart, seamlessly connects individuals to the social reality they inhabit. We then describe recent empirical work on the psychology of norms and locate the notions of informal institutions and soft structures with (...) respect to it. Finally, we argue that the empirical resources enrich Witt’s ascriptivism, and that the resulting picture shows theorists need not, indeed should not, choose between either the individualist or structuralist camp. (shrink)

KEY POINTS In Canada, commercial data brokers collect deidentified patient data from pharmacies, private drug insurers, the federal government and medical clinics without patient consent. Although pharmaceutical companies are the data brokers’ primary customers, academics and nonprofit and public entities also use commercial data sets, given the absence of a coordinated public approach to collecting these data across Canada. Risks of commercialized patient data include loss of anonymity, surveillance and marketing, discrimination and violation of Indigenous data sovereignty. Coordinated infrastructure for (...) the collection and coordination of health data across Canada and updated privacy legislation would protect individuals and communities and enable appropriate data uses. (shrink)

Ang mga kwentong Jollibee na dinalumat ng mananaliksik ay binubuo ng tatlumpot-siyam (39) na mga kwentong hango sa totoong buhay. Tinatalakay ng pag-aaral na ito ang mga konseptong AIDA sa mga kwentong Jollibee sa paraang panghihikayat sa madla gamit ang advertising. Layunin nito na mailahad ang kaugnayan ng konseptong AIDA sa mga kwentong binibigyang tampok ng Jollibee sa iba’t ibang selebrasyon mula sa taong 2016-2022. Kaya naman gumamit ng metodong pagsusuri ng dokumento (document analysis), at thematic analysis ang mananaliksik. Ang (...) prosesong ito ay nagsasangkot ng pagsusuri ng mga elektroniko at pisikal na dokumento upang bigyang-kahulugan ang mga ito, magkaroon ng pag-unawa sa kanilang kahulugan at bumuo batay sa impormasyong ibinibigay ng bawat datos na susuriin. Inilatag din sa pag-aaral na ito ang iba’t ibang teorya na naging sandigan upang maisakatuparan ang metodong ginamit ganoon din ang kabuuang pag-aaral. Dahil dito, natamo ng mananaliksik ang resulta ng ginawang pag-aaral kung saan, natukoy ang konseptong AIDA sa tatlumpot -siyam (39) na mga kwentong Jollibee na inisa-isa sa pamamagitan ng paglalatag sa paraang talahanayan. Makikitang ang naging interpretasyon sa isinagawang pag-aaral ay ang dulot na saya at kakaibang epekto ng mga kwentong Jollibee sa mga manonood nito, tumatangkilik ng mga produkto, at ang walang pinipiling konsyumer. Malinaw na sa sa paglalapat ng mga Konseptong AIDA sa pagpapakilala ng mga produkto ay makatutulong ng malaki upang tangkilikin ito ng mamamayan. Tulad ng pag-aaral na ito, kung saan binigyang pokus ang konseptong AIDA sa mga kwentong Jollibee. Hindi kapansin-pansin kung hindi pagtutuunan ng pansin, subalit dahil sa ilang sandigan ay nabigyan ng katuparan ang pag-aaral na ito. Makikita rin dito ang mga paksang madalas pagtuunan ng pansin sa mga kwentong Jollibee, ito ay ang mga espisyal na okasyon tulad ng; Monther’s Day, Valentines Day, Grandparents Day, at ang Christmas Day. At sa bawat kwentong Jollibee, mababakas ang makatutuhanang nagaganap sa reyalidad ng buhay sa bawat pamilyang Pilipino. Ang makamasang tema nito, at damdaming naipadarama sa bawat kwento. (shrink)

In this brief introduction, I shall rather reflect, from a biographer’s viewpoint, on the significance of Discretion for our understanding of the trajectory of Hart’s ideas and on the significance of his year at Harvard. I shall then move on to consider the intriguing question of why Hart did not subsequently publish or build on some of the key insights in the paper itself. Here I highlight the fact that, almost uniquely in Hart’s work, Discretion features a notable emphasis on (...) the significance of institutional factors in our understanding of the nature of legal decisionmaking; and I argue that Hart’s failure fully to develop this insight in the essay, or to build on it in his subsequent work, derives from the fact that such a development would have necessitated a diversion from the philosophical issues that were his core intellectual concern, and moreover would have presented certain dangers to his conception of legal positivism. I shall conclude by considering what contribution the essay makes to our overall interpretation and evaluation of Hart’s legal philosophy. (shrink)

The Mindoro State University Bongabong Campus extension unit is still opera- tional amid the COVID-19 pandemic. This paper evaluates the implementation of the "eSupport: Continuation of Extension Services Amid Covid-19 Pandemic," an extension program by the College of Computer Studies faculty and students. This ex- tension program included six topics delivered via a free webinar series and online training programs through Google Meet, Zoom, MS Teams, and Facebook Live and some conducted face-to-face. Participants or beneficiaries in the webinars, online and (...) face-to-face training, and extensionists served as respondents of the study. The narrative research design was used, and the data were treated using the weighted mean. The instrument used in the study was a university evaluation questionnaire on extension services. The evaluation sheet was divided into strategy, speaker, and services. The study revealed that community beneficiaries gave positive assessments and feedback on the College of Computer Studies' extension project. Participants' and extensionists' or implementers' experiences and recommendations will be considered in future planning, implementation, and impact assessments. (shrink)

A topic of special importance when it comes to responsibility and implicit bias is responsibility for knowledge. Are there strategies for becoming more responsible and respectful knowers? How might we work together, not just as individuals but members of collectives, to reduce the negative effects of bias on what we see and believe, as well as the wrongs associated with epistemic injustice? To explore these questions, Chapter 9 introduces the concept of epistemic responsibility, a set of practices developed through the (...) cultivation of basic epistemic virtues, such as open-mindedness, epistemic humility, and diligence that help knowers seek information about themselves, others, and the world. (shrink)

Rigorous proof is supposed to guarantee that the premises invoked imply the conclusion reached, and the problem of rigor may be described as that of bringing together the perspectives of formal logic and mathematical practice on how this is to be achieved. This problem has recently raised a lot of discussion among philosophers of mathematics. We survey some possible solutions and argue that failure to understand its terms properly has led to misunderstandings in the literature.

In this paper, we introduce an enactive account of loving as participatory sense-making inspired by the “I love to you” of the feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray. Emancipating from the fusionist concept of romantic love, which understands love as unity, we conceptualise loving as an existential engagement in a dialectic of encounter, in continuous processes of becoming-in-relation. In these processes, desire acquires a certain prominence as the need to know (the other, the relation, oneself) more. We build on Irigaray’s account of (...) love to present a phenomenology of loving interactions and then our enactive account. Finally, we draw some implications for ethics. These concern language, difference, vulnerability, desire, and self-transformation. (shrink)

This paper investigates agents’ blameworthiness when they are part of a group that does harm. We analyse three factors that affect the scope of an agent’s blameworthiness in these cases: shared intentionality, interpersonal influence, and common knowledge. Each factor involves circumstantial luck. The more each factor is present, the greater is the scope of each agent’s vicarious blameworthiness for the other agents’ contributions to the harm. We then consider an agent’s degree of blameworthiness, as distinct from her scope of blameworthiness. (...) We suggest that an agent mostly controls her degree of blameworthiness—but even here, luck constrains what possible degrees of blameworthiness are open to her. (shrink)

Multivariate pattern analysis, or MVPA, has become one of the most popular analytic methods in cognitive neuroscience. Since its inception, MVPA has been heralded as offering much more than regular univariate analyses, for—we are told—it not only can tell us which brain regions are engaged while processing particular stimuli, but also which patterns of neural activity represent the categories the stimuli are selected from. We disagree, and in the current paper we offer four conceptual challenges to the use of MVPA (...) to make claims about neural representation. Our view is that the use of MVPA to make claims about neural representation is problematic. (shrink)

If there is an area of discourse in which disagreement is virtually absent, it is mathematics. After all, mathematicians justify their claims with deductive proofs: arguments that entail their conclusions. But is mathematics really exceptional in this respect? Looking at the history and practice of mathematics, we soon realize that it is not. First, deductive arguments must start somewhere. How should we choose the starting points (i.e., the axioms)? Second, mathematicians, like the rest of us, are fallible. Their ability to (...) recognize whether a putative proof is correct is not infallible. In most cases, disagreement over the correctness of a putative proof is, however, evanescent. Once an error is spotted and communicated, the disagreement disappears. But this is not always the case. Sometimes it is recalcitrant; that is, it persists over time. In order to zoom in on this type of disagreement and explain its very possibility, we focus on a single case study: a decades-long (1921-1949) controversy between Federigo Enriques and Francesco Severi, two prominent exponents of the Italian school of algebraic geometry. We suggest that the instability of the mathematical community to which they belonged can be explained by the gap between an abstract criterion of rigor and local criteria of acceptability. It is this instability that made the existence of recalcitrant disagreement over putative proofs possible. We do not condemn speculative mathematics but rather its pretense of being rigorous mathematics. In this respect, we show that the overly self-confident Severi and the more intuitive, visionary Enriques had a completely different attitude. (shrink)

This letter addresses the editorial decision to publish the article, “Research on group differences in intelligence: A defense of free inquiry” (Cofnas, 2020). Our letter points out several critical problems with Cofnas's article, which we believe should have either disqualified the manuscript upon submission or been addressed during the review process and resulted in substantial revisions.

In this paper, I argue that the ecological approach to perception provides resources to overcome the causal argument against disjunctivism. According to the causal argument, since the brain states that proximally cause the perceptual experience and the corresponding hallucinatory one can be of the same type, there would be no good reason to reject that the perceptual experience and the corresponding hallucinatory experience have fundamentally the same nature. Disjunctivism concerning the nature of the experience would then be false. I identify (...) three assumptions that support the causal argument: the indistinguishability assumption, the linearity assumption, and the duplication assumption. According to the ecological approach to disjunctivism, these assumptions should be rejected, opening up room for a version of disjunctivism that I call 'Ecological Disjunctivism'. Perceptual episodes are extended over time and are supervenient to the organism-environment system. They can be distinguished from the 'corresponding' hallucinations because the former results from a controlled process of attunement to the environment, whereas hallucinations are passive and insensible to the exploratory activities of the perceptual system. Finally, ecological disjunctivism, since it is immune to the causal argument, is more advantageous than negative and positive disjunctivism. (shrink)

This paper takes a cognitive perspective to assess the significance of some Late Palaeolithic artefacts (sculptures and engraved objects) for philosophicalconcepts of art. We examine cognitive capacities that are necessary to produceand recognize objects that are denoted as art. These include the ability toattribute and infer design (design stance), the ability to distinguish between themateriality of an object and its meaning (symbol-mindedness), and an aesthetic sensitivity to some perceptual stimuli. We investigate to what extent thesecognitive processes played a role in (...) the production and appreciation of somerecently discovered Palaeolithic artefacts. (shrink)

The relationship between topological explanation and mechanistic explanation is unclear. Most philosophers agree that at least some topological explanations are mechanistic explanations. The crucial question is how to make sense of this claim. Zednik (Philos Psychol 32(1):23–51, 2019) argues that topological explanations are mechanistic if they (i) describe mechanism sketches that (ii) pick out organizational properties of mechanisms. While we agree with Zednik’s conclusion, we critically discuss Zednik’s account and show that it fails as a general account of how and (...) when topological explanations are mechanistic. First, if topological explanations were just mechanism sketches, this implies that they could be enriched by replacing topological terms with mechanistic detail. This, however, conflicts how topological explanations are used in scientific practice. Second, Zednik’s account fails to show how topological properties can be organizational properties of mechanisms that have a place in mechanistic explanation. The core issue is that Zednik’s account ignores that topological properties often are _global_ properties while mechanistic explanantia refer to _local_ properties. We demonstrate how these problems can be solved by a recent account of mechanistic completeness (Craver and Kaplan in Br J Philos Sci 71(1):287–319, 2020; Kohár and Krickel in Calzavarini and Viola (eds) Neural mechanisms—new challenges in the philosophy of neuroscience, Springer, New York, 2021) and use a multilayer network model of Alzheimer’s Disease to illustrate this. (shrink)

In this essay we will argue for the following theses: 1- know-how is not a form of practical knowledge devoid of propositional sense; 2- the relationship between each perception and the body itself is metaphysically contingent (organisms and bodies can vary, as can even the spaces they occupy in the same experience vary), 3- it is up to the brain to configure or to shape a physical body (Körper) into a living body (Leib) and not the other way around; 4- (...) phenomenal externalism of enactivist nature, even in its mild form, is empirically implausible: the correlation between the conscious character of sensory experience with spatiotemporal neuronal patterns is much more systematic and regular than with anything outside the brain. But in its radical form is entirely implausible and contra-intuitive: phenomenal duplicates are not necessarily duplicates of agency; in short, 5-we are our own brain that has a body, avatars, and artifacts, properly configured, and molded by the brain, and not a body that has a brain among other essential organs. (shrink)

The ideas behind open source software are currently applied to the production of encyclopedias. A sample of six English text-based, neutral-point-of-view, online encyclopedias of the kind are identified: h2g2, Wikipedia, Scholarpedia, Encyclopedia of Earth, Citizendium and Knol. How do these projects deal with the problem of trusting their participants to behave as competent and loyal encyclopedists? Editorial policies for soliciting and processing content are shown to range from high discretion to low discretion; that is, from granting unlimited trust to limited (...) trust. Their conceptions of the proper role for experts are also explored and it is argued that to a great extent they determine editorial policies. Subsequently, internal discussions about quality guarantee at Wikipedia are rendered. All indications are that review and ?super-review? of new edits will become policy, to be performed by Wikipedians with a better reputation. Finally, while for encyclopedias the issue of organizational trust largely coincides with epistemological trust, a link is made with theories about the acceptance of testimony. It is argued that both non-reductionist views (the ?acceptance principle? and the ?assurance view?) and reductionist ones (an appeal to background conditions, and a?newly defined??expertise view?) have been implemented in editorial strategies over the past decade. (shrink)

In his Lectures on Fine Art (1835), Hegel emphasizes the grotesque character of Indian art. Grotesqueness results, in his view, from a contradiction between meaning and shape due to the incongruous combination of spiritual and material elements. Since Hegel's history of art is teeming with examples of inadequacy between meaning and shape, this paper aims to distinguish the grotesque from other types of artistic dissonance and to problematize Hegel's ascriptions of grotesqueness to ancient Indian art. In the first part of (...) the paper, I characterize the grotesque by the unnatural distortion of natural shapes with the purpose of achieving a direct sensuous manifestation of an indeterminate and impersonal divinity, Brahman. Such an attempt is, in Hegel's view, self-contradictory and self-defeating, leading to an exaggeration of the conflict between nature and spirit instead of the intended reconciliation between the two parts. In the second part of the paper, I compare Hegel's account of Indian art to the ‘monstrous myths’ of early modern Europe. Unlike his predecessors, Hegel legitimizes the grotesque representations of Hindu gods as endowed with profound meaning and the result of a universal human need, yet he describes them as ultimately irrational and repulsive based on a prejudiced view of the Indian people(s). In this sense, Hegel's assessment of Indian art functions as a reflection of modern European culture, its fascination and horror in the face of what Enlightenment could not entirely purge, rather than as a truthful and objective account of Indian art and culture. By questioning Hegel's characterization of Hindu iconography and mythology, this paper contributes to underexplored areas of Hegelian aesthetics, namely Hegel's account of symbolic art, especially Indian art, as well as his views on negative aesthetic experiences and values. (shrink)

Prometheus has grown four years older since its last and highly controversial special issue, published in 2017 on the Shaken Baby Debate. But, as always, Prometheus is committed to open discussion and dissemination of scientific research, regardless of the potential backlash or controversy that may ensue from such a venture, a venture that is at the core of authentic scholarship. Since the beginning of 2020, the world has changed irrevocably, making once-held norms seem obsolete in favour of new ways of (...) being in the world and new technologies emerging to face these new ways of living. Although it has been a long-held insight in the philosophy of technology that technical systems are carriers of values, the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has made manifest how these values, and their incarnations in sociotechnical systems, can likewise change. Prometheus has, since its inception, danced in tandem with the critical interpretations, theories, and methods for understanding innovation, and how innovations fundamentally impact and are impacted by the world in which they emerge and are situated. For this reason, Steffen Steinert, Tristan de Wildt, and I chose to guest edit this special issue on designing for value change and chose Prometheus as its home. (shrink)

Drawing from narratology and design studies, this article makes use of the notions of the ‘implied designer’ and ‘ludic unreliability’ to understand deceptive game design as a specific sub-set of transgressive game design. More specifically, in this text we present deceptive game design as the deliberate attempt to misguide players’ inferences about the designers’ intentions. Furthermore, we argue that deceptive design should not merely be taken as a set of design choices aimed at misleading players in their efforts to understand (...) the game, but also as decisions devised to give rise to experiential and emotional effects that are in the interest of players. Finally, we propose to introduce a distinction between two varieties of deceptive design approaches based on whether they operate in an overt or a covert fashion in relation to player experience. Our analysis casts light on expressive possibilities that are not customarily part of the dominant paradigm of user-centered design, and can inform game designers in their pursuit of wider and more nuanced creative aspirations. (shrink)

In his book, "Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge" (2011), John McDowell advocates that the warrant provided by perception is infallible. For such, it is necessary to understand the role reason plays in the constitution of genuine perceptual states. Based on reason, we situate these states in the logical space of reasoning. So, we not only make the perceptual state into an episode of knowledge, but we also acquire knowledge of how we arrived to that knowledge. McDowell argues that this (...) condition for knowledge - the possession of the capacity to situate a perceptual state in the logical space of reasoning - does not commit him to intellectualism. In this paper, I defend that McDowell's internalism is not entirely exempt from intellectualism, and that internalism is more reasonable not only without intellectualism, but also without reflexivity. (shrink)

Nesta edição especial, O Corpo é discurso apresenta os resultados do Curso A construção do sujeito em Kant - As luzes de Foucault, organizado pelo professor Nílton Milanez e por Jamille Silva Santos, integrante do Labedisco e mestranda do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Linguística, pela Universidade Estadual do Sudoeste da Bahia.

In this paper, I try to articulate and clarify the role of the epistemic authority of experts in Kuhn’s explanation for the transition process between rival paradigms in the scientific revolutionary period. If science progresses, that process should contribute to the attainment of the cognitive aim of science, namely, the articulation of paradigms increasingly successful at the resolution of problems. It is hard to see that process as rational and as attaining the cognitive aim of science without the consideration of (...) epistemic authority.The mistake of Kuhn was to emphasize and clarify insufficiently the role of the epistemic authority of experts; his critics failed for ignoring it altogether. (shrink)

We are addressing this letter to the editors of Philosophical Psychology after reading an article they decided to publish in the recent vol. 33, issue 1. The article is by Nathan Cofnas and is entitled “Research on group differences in intelligence: A defense of free inquiry” (2020). The purpose of our letter is not to invite Cofnas’s contribution into a broader dialogue, but to respectfully voice our concerns about the decision to publish the manuscript, which, in our opinion, fails to (...) meet a range of academic quality standards usually expected of academic publications. (shrink)

Hacker communities of the 1970s and 1980s developed a quite characteristic work ethos. Its norms are explored and shown to be quite similar to those which Robert Merton suggested govern academic life: communism, universalism, disinterestedness, and organized scepticism. In the 1990s the Internet multiplied the scale of these communities, allowing them to create successful software programs like Linux and Apache. After renaming themselves the `open source software' movement, with an emphasis on software quality, they succeeded in gaining corporate interest. As (...) one of the main results, their `open' practices have entered industrial software production. The resulting clash of cultures, between the more academic CUDOS norms and their corporate counterparts, is discussed and assessed. In all, the article shows that software practices are a fascinating seedbed for the genesis of work ethics of various kinds, depending on their societal context. (shrink)

McDowell’s minimal empiricism holds that experience, understood as providing conceptually articulated contents, plays a role in the justification of our beliefs. We question this idea by contrasting the role of perceptual experience in moral and non-moral judgments and conclude that experience per se is irrelevant in the former case and should also be so in the latter one: only with the help of adequate beliefs experience can provide a connection with the world. We conclude with some remarks concerning the importance (...) of experience. (shrink)

The aim is to examine the performative acts and gender constitution in the context of the Second British Invasion. Despite the pervasive character of patriarchy and the prevalence of sexual difference as an operative cultural distinction, gender was not passively scripted on the bodies of many British singers. The subversive performances did not exclude suffering and marginalization but simultaneously undermined compulsory coherence.

Heidegger tries to explain our emotional life applying three schemes: causal explanation, mental internalisation of emotions and metaphorical expression. None of the three schemes explains emotion though. Either because the causal nexus does not always occur or because objects and people in the external world are carriers of emotional agents or because language is already on a metaphorical level. Moreover, how is it possible that there are presently emotions constituting our life without our being aware of their existence? From the (...) analysis of boredom in its three varieties (“bored by X”, “get oneself bored”, and “it is boring”) we will get to the depth where emotions lie, trying to rouse them and to keep them awake. Although it surfaces with the force and energy of the present, every emotion has its past and future constitution. How can we understand the future of a present emotion along with its past? (shrink)

A presente investigação tem por objetivo responder à questão título considerando os argumentos apresentados, de um lado, pelos desenvolvimentistas e, de outro, pelos ambientalistas. Entendemos que os argumentos apresentados refletem um conflito de valores mais profundo que, se abordado por uma metodologia de solução de conflitos adequada, pode contribuir para elucidação da questão. A metodologia proposta é o personalismo ético de Scheler. A hierarquia de valores a ser aplicada na solução de conflitos traz (i) o valor pessoa como o mais (...) elevado, seguido dos (ii) valores espirituais, como a justiça, (iii) os vitais, como o bem estar e o útil, e (iv) os sensíveis. Através das ações de preferir e postergar, é possível encontrar pontos de equilíbrio numa permanente atitude crítica. O objetivo é contribuir para que as ações ocorram com a devida diligência para com os direitos humanos. A hipótese inicial é que, identificando os valores em conflito e aplicando a metodologia descrita, a solução de conflitos neste caso concreto permite pensar numa transição energética que concilie o desenvolvimento e o meio ambiente. Compreendemos que ambos têm como fim proteger o valor pessoa. Portanto, o que está em conflito de fato, sem com isso assumir uma postura ingênua, são os valores espirituais e vitais de cada uma das partes. Neste sentido, defendemos que, diante da inevitável demanda por energia da sociedade contemporânea e do alto custo da transição energética, é preciso conciliar o desenvolvimento com o meio ambiente a partir de uma programada transição energética financiada pela exploração do petróleo e gás, mas com metas definidas comprometidas com a neutralidade da emissão de GEE em 2050. Para tanto, é necessário regulamentação, monitoramento e fiscalização por parte do Estado e do governo federal com a finalidade de garantir a substituição dos combustíveis fósseis por fontes energéticas limpas. (shrink)

Touch seems to enjoy some epistemic advantage over the other senses when it comes to attest to the reality of external objects. The question is not whether only what appears in tactile experiences is real. It is that only whether appears in tactile experiences feels real to the subject. In this chapter we first clarify how exactly the rather vague idea of an epistemic advantage of touch over the other senses should be interpreted. We then defend a “muscular thesis”, to (...) the effect that only the experience of resistance to our motor efforts, as it arises in effortful touch, presents us with the independent existence of some causally empowered object. We finally consider whether this muscular thesis applies to the perception of our own body. (shrink)

Readings of Kant’s Critique as endorsing phenomenalism have occupied the spotlight in recent times: ontological phenomenalism, semantic phenomenalism, analytical phenomenalism, epistemological phenomenalism, and so on. Yet, they raise the same old coherence problem with the Critique : are they compatible with Kant’s Refutation of Idealism? Are they able to reconcile the Fourth Paralogism of the first edition with the Refutation of the second, since Kant repeatedly claimed that he never changed his mind in-between the two editions of his Critique? This (...) paper addresses the key question: was Kant a phenomenalist and, if he was, in which precise sense? I propose a metaphysical but not ontologically reductionist reading of Kant as a phenomenalist. I argue for the following claims. To be sure, for Kant appearance is mere representation. Yet, appearance is representation only insofar as we take “appearance” in the empirical sense, namely the way that the mind-independent existing noumenon appears in space and, crucially, when we take “representation” in the transcendental sense, namely the mind -dependent way that we can cognize the same mind-independent existing noumenon. How shall I argue in defense of my alternative reading? First, I argue that my reading is pretty much compatible with Kant’s Refutation. Second, I argue that my reading reconciles the causal with the intentional readings of the Refutation. Third, I argue that my reading makes the Fourth Paralogism of the first edition and the Refutation of Idealism of the second completely compatible. (shrink)

The paper introduces Vailati’s life and works, investigating Vailati’s education, the relation to Peano and his school, and the interest for pragmatism and modernism. A detailed analysis of Vailati’s scientific and didactic activities, shows that he held, like Peano, a a strong interest for the history of science and a pluralist, anti-dogmatic and anti-foundationalist conception of definitions in mathematics, logic and philosophy of language. Vailati’s understanding of mathematical logic as a form of pragmatism is not a faithful interpretation of Peano’s (...) conception, but it is essential to understand the relations of Peano’s logic with other philosophical traditions and some epistemological aspects of Peano’s perspective, such as the search for a universal language. (shrink)

Este ensaio celebra as cinco décadas da publicação do livro A ordem do discurso de Michel Foucault, realizando uma reflexão acerca de sua repercussão entre as ciências sociais e sobre seus usos, principalmente, no campo da linguagem na parte relacionada à análise do discurso de linha francesa. Portanto, trata-se de uma retrospectiva crítica cuja análise começa com a entrevista que Foucault concedeu algumas semanas antes de proferir esta aula aos brasileiros Sergio Paulo Rouanet e José Guilherme Merquior. Em seguida, o (...) presente trabalho faz uma breve história da entrada de Foucault ao Collège de France e, por fim, lida com a microfísica do discurso que se encontra nesta aula, sobretudo, da rarefação do sujeito, além dos seus usos nas ciências humanas e sociais mais o campo da linguagem em torno da pragmática e das análises de discurso. (shrink)

Benchmarking automated theorem proving (ATP) systems using standardized problem sets is a well-established method for measuring their performance. However, the availability of such libraries for non-classical logics is very limited. In this work we propose a library for benchmarking Girard's (propositional) intuitionistic linear logic. For a quick bootstrapping of the collection of problems, and for discussing the selection of relevant problems and understanding their meaning as linear logic theorems, we use translations of the collection of Kleene's intuitionistic theorems in the (...) traditional monograph "Introduction to Metamathematics". We analyze four different translations of intuitionistic logic into linear logic and compare their proofs using a linear logic based prover with focusing. In order to enhance the set of problems in our library, we apply the three provability-preserving translations to the propositional benchmarks in the ILTP Library. Finally, we generate a comprehensive set of reachability problems for Petri nets and encode such problems as linear logic sequents, thus enlarging our collection of problems. (shrink)

Technical artifacts have the capacity to fulfill their function in virtue of their physicochemical make-up. An explanation that purports to explicate this relation between artifact function and structure can be called a technological explanation. It might be argued, and Peter Kroes has in fact done so, that there issomething peculiar about technological explanations in that they are intrinsically normative in some sense. Since the notion of artifact function is a normative one an explanation of an artifact’s function must inherit this (...) normativity.In this paper I will resist this conclusion by outlining and defending a ‘buck-passing account’ of the normativity of technological explanations. I will first argue that it is important to distinguish properly between a theory of function ascriptions and an explanation of how a function is realized. The task of the former is to spell out the conditions under which one is justified in ascribing a function to an artifact; the latter should show how the physicochemical make-up of an artifact enables it to fulfill its function. Second, I wish to maintain that a good theory of function ascriptions should account for the normativity of these ascriptions. Provided such a function theory can be formulated — as I think it can — a technological explanation may pass the normativity buck to it. Third, to flesh out these abstract claims, I show how a particular function theory — to wit, the ICE theory by Pieter Vermaas and Wybo Houkes — can be dovetailed smoothly with my own thoughts on technological explanation. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to provide an overview of New Realism in its opposition and reaction to Postmodernism. An analysis of the implications of both philosophical approaches in diverse fields will be offered, from epistemology, to politics, to ethics. Ethical new realism is presented as particularly promising and important to the future of philosophy.

This paper is both systematic and historical in nature. From a historical viewpoint, I aim to show that to establish Wittgenstein’s claim that “an ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria” (PI §580) there is an enthymeme in Wittgenstein’s private language argument (henceforth PLA) overlooked in the literature, namely Wittgenstein’s suggestion that both perceptual and bodily experiences are transparent in the relevant sense that one cannot point to a mental state and wonder “What is that?” From a systematic viewpoint, (...) I aim to show that Wittgenstein’s PLA teaches us that the prevailing picture of the nature of phenomenal concepts (henceforth PCs) is upside down: we can only introspectively know what is going on inside our heads after we learn of what is going on outside (PI §580). In this regard, I aim to defend two associate claims against the prevailing view of PCs on the basis of PLA. First, by means of transparency, I aim to show that there is no de re awareness of our private sensation that could determine the meaning of sensation words; for example, I am never aware of the phenomenal blueness of my experience of something blue. The second associated claim is that introspective self-knowledge of our private sensations is always de dicto. We can only know introspectively that phenomenal blueness is the phenomenal character of the experience we are undergoing after we have learned that (de dicto knowledge) blue is the color that usually causes us that kind of experience. Likewise, we can only introspectively know that pain is the phenomenal character of the experience we are undergoing after we have learned that pain is what usually causes some typical pain behavior. (shrink)

Este artículo pretende ofrecer una visión alternativa tanto de la lectura conceptualista tradicional de Kant como de la nueva lectura no conceptualista. En contra de las lecturas conceptualistas tradicionales sostengo que confunden las condiciones para la representación sensible de los objetos (tesis de la intencionalidad) con las condiciones para el reconocimiento (Erkenntnis) de que representamos objetos mediante intuiciones sensibles (tesis del reconocimiento). En contra de las lecturas no conceptualistas sostengo que no distinguen el no conceptualismo -propio de la filosofía contemporánea (...) de la mente- de las tesis antiintelectualistas de Kant. Tales lecturas fracasan porque se equivocan al atribuir un contenido representacional a las intuiciones sensibles de Kant. Las intuiciones sensibles, según Kant, no presentan el mundo según ciertas condiciones de satisfacción que podrían o no ser satisfechas por el mundo. Por lo tanto, no son ni verídicas ni non verídicas. Se limitan a presentar el mundo de una manera directa, independiente de los conceptos, lo que llamaré aquí la presentación de re de los objetos. En mi lectura, la oposición entre intuiciones y conceptos es la oposición entre la presentación de re de um objeto y el reconocimento proposicional de dicto de que representamos algo como um objeto. (shrink)

Despite the fact that common sense taxes emotions with irrationality, philosophers have, by and large, celebrated their functionality. They are credited with motivating, steadying, shaping or harmonizing our dispositions to act, and with policing norms of social behaviour. It's time to restore emotion's bad rep. To this end, I shall argue that we should expect that some of the “norms” enforced by emotions will be unevenly distributed among the members of our species, and may be dysfunctional at the individual, social, (...) moral, or even species levels. I”ll adduce three considerations in support of that pessimistic view: The fallacy of adaptive fixation, the moral randomness of group selection, and the lack of fit between “natural norms” set up by evolution and those moral and social norms we would like philosophy to justify. (shrink)

Este trabalho apresenta algumas considerações a respeito da Base Nacional Comum Curricular (BNCC), no referente às questões ligadas ao ensino da língua portuguesa no Brasil, à territorialidade e ao pertencimento racial, processos históricos, que envolvem, no campo da educação, a formação docente e a construção da cidadania dos educandos e das educandas nestes tempos de reafirmação do Estado democrático de direito e da vaga decolonial. Portanto, trata-se de uma abordagem política em termos do pensamento de Paulo Freire, patrono da educação (...) brasileira, que considerava político o ato de educar (FREIRE, 1980; 1983; 1989; 1996). É com base nesta perspectiva que a BNCC será abordada, mas sob o aporte teórico da análise pragmática do discurso, tributária da análise discursivo-desconstrutiva (cf. ARAÚJO, 2020). (shrink)

What does Cyberpunk and AI Ethics have to do with each other? Cyberpunk is a sub-genre of science fiction that explores the post-human relationships between human experience and technology. One similarity between AI Ethics and Cyberpunk literature is that both seek a dialogue in which the reader may inquire about the future and the ethical and social problems that our technological advance may bring upon society. In recent years, an increasing number of ethical matters involving AI have been pointed and (...) debated, and several ethical principles and guides have been suggested as governance policies for the tech industry. However, would this be the role of AI Ethics? To serve as a soft and ambiguous version of the law? I would like to promote in this article a more Cyberpunk way of doing AI Ethics, whit a more anarchic way of governance. In this study, I will seek to expose some of the deficits of the underlying power structures of our society, and suggest that AI governance be subject to public opinion, so that ‘good AI’ can become ‘good AI for all’. (shrink)

(1996). What the prophet and the philosopher told their nations: A multi‐modal systems view of norms and civilisation. World Futures: Vol. 47, Unity and Diversity in Contemporary Systems Tinking: Systematic Pictures at an Exhibition, pp. 53-67.

É possível trabalhar com textos clássicos da filosofia no atual contexto das escolas públicas brasileiras? Se sim, como fazer uso desses textos? Quais as possibilidades e os limites para nossas pretensões, enquanto professores de filosofia, quanto ao uso do texto filosófico? Importantes teóricos do ensino de filosofia no Brasil, tal como Lidia Maria Rodrigo, Renata Aspis e Silvio Gallo, defenderam que os textos filosóficos não apenas podem e devem ser trabalhados em sala de aula, mas ainda que tais textos devem (...) ocupar papel central no ensino da disciplina. Cabe refletir sobre essa proposta a partir da realidade na qual estamos hoje inseridos, pretensão do texto que se segue e cujo objetivo é discutir as possibilidades e os limites do uso do texto filosófico a partir do relato de minha experiência no estágio em filosofia, que foi realizado em uma turma do segundo ano do Ensino Médio em uma escola pública da cidade de Santa Maria, RS. (shrink)

In consciousness studies, the first-person perspective, seen as a way to approach consciousness, is often seen as nothing but a variant of the third-person perspective. One of the most important advocates of this view is Dennett. However, as I show in critical interaction with Dennett’s view, the first-person perspective and the third-person perspective are different ways of asking questions about themes. What these questions are is determined by the purposes that we have when we ask them. Since our purposes are (...) different according to the perspective we take, each perspective has a set of leading questions of its own. This makes that the first-person perspective is an approach of consciousness that is substantially different from the third-person perspective, and that one cannot be reduced to the other. These perspectives are independent, although complementary approaches of the mind. (shrink)

This article presents a defense of “presentist externalism,” that is, the claim that memory contents are fixed by the environment and by the time at which a recollection takes place rather than by those at which the original mental state occurred. Its case is an instance of an argument to the best explanation. The author argues, firstly, that “presentist externalism” is the only version of content externalism that can stand up to both Boghossian’s memory and fallacy arguments. In slow switching (...) cases, inferences containing memory thoughts as premises are unsound or unsafe, but valid. The author contends, secondly, that the externalist must recognize the existence of wide mismemories besides wide forgetting and that only the presentist externalist can account for their existence. The author maintains, finally, that if the validity of an inference requires that all its premises and conclusion be evaluated in the same context, that in which the inference is made, then it is the present context that fixes the content and the concepts of memory rather than the past. (shrink)